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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

PATRICK HENRY VALDEZ,

:

Case No. 20070614-CA

:

Appellant is incarcerated.

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Theft by Receiving Stolen
Property, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2003);
Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(2003); Forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2003);
and two counts of Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, third degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2003), in the Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Deno Himonas, presiding.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(2002). S>ee Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment).1

A copy of the Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment from each of the five cases has
been included in Addendum A.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Point. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by consecutively imposing Mr.
Valdez's five terms of 0-5 years in prison where the state and presentence report
recommended concurrent sentences.
Standard of Review: This Court reviews sentences for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113,1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "'An abuse of discretion
may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the
judge imposed a "clearly excessive" sentence.'" State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah
1991) (citation omitted).
Preservation: This issue was preserved below. R. 55:5; 43.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of the following relevant provision is provided in full in Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is a consolidation of the five following cases: On June 6, 2006, in case
number 061907518 ("7518"), Mr. Valdez was charged by Information with Forgery, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501; Purchase, Transfer,
Possession or Use of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a class A

Five copies of the sentencing hearing were inadvertently requested and made part of the
record. For ease of reference, Appellant cites to only the hearing record numbered "55"
when referring to the sentencing hearing.
2

misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(b); Attempted Theft by
Deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405; Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-408; and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5. R. (7518): 1-4. On July 20, 2006, in case
number 061904724 ("724"), Mr. Valdez was charged by Information with Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6408; and Theft by Deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-405. R. (724):2-3.
On September 7, 2007, in case number 061905899 ("899"), Mr. Valdez was
charged by Information with Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-202; Theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6404; and Criminal Mischief, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-106. R. (899):2-4. On October 12, 2006, in case number 061906778 ("778"), Mr.
Valdez was charged by Information with Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408. On November 13, 2006, in
case number 07901234 ("234"), Mr. Valdez was charged by Information with Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-408; and Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-210. R. (234):l-3.

3

On April 20, 2007, Mr. Valdez entered a guilty plea to Forgery, a third degree
felony (R.( 7518):35); Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony (R.
(724):39); an amended charge of Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony (R. (899):31);
an amended charge of Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree
felony (R. (234):79); and an amended charge of Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen
Property, a third degree felony (R. (778):32). A presentence report was ordered and
prepared for sentencing purposes. R. 43.
On June 22, 2007, the trial court imposed 5 indeterminate terms of zero to five
years in the Utah State Prison, consecutively. R. 55:8-9; see also R. (7518):46-47;
(723):44-45; (899):42-43; (234):90-91; (778):41-42.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 20, 2007, Mr. Valdez entered a guilty plea to Forgery, a third degree
felony (R. (7518):35); Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony (R.
(724):39); an amended charge of Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony (R. (899):31);
an amended charge of Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree
felony (R. (234):79); and an amended charge of Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen
Property, a third degree felony (R. (778):32). A presentence report was ordered and
prepared for sentencing purposes. R. 43; see Addendum C.
On June 22, 2007, a hearing was held for Mr. Valdez to be sentenced in all five
cases. R. 55. During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that the trial court
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should follow the presentence reports recommendation of concurrent sentences. R. 55:5,
8. The presentence report prepared by Adult Probation and Parole (AP & P)
recommended Mr. Valdez be sentenced to prison "for the terms prescribed by law, to be
served concurrently . . . ." R. 43:2. Initially, the presentence investigator "had empathy
for [Mr. Valdez] and thought he should be given one chance at probation with treatment"
but because the offenses involved victims, the investigator thought concurrent sentences
were more appropriate. R. 43:3.
Defense counsel argued that while he was not going to attempt to minimize Mr.
Valdez's lengthy criminal record, Mr. Valdez's attitude throughout these cases should be
taken into consideration. R. 55:3. Mr. Valdez has expressed deep remorse during the
course of the proceedings for his actions. R. 43; 55:3-5. Counsel argued that Mr. Valdez
"ha[d] taken a level of responsibility that quite frankly [he has] not seen before, and a
level of self awareness about what his problem is and what needs to happen that [he
thought was] very, very rare." R. 55:3. Mr. Valdez's focus throughout the proceedings
has not been to avoid serving time for the offenses but to receive help to overcome his
drug addiction which he cannot do on his own. R. 55:3-5.
The prosecutor "agree[d] with the recommendation" of concurrent sentences. R.
55:5. The prosecutor stated that although he was recommending prison in an attempt to
protect the community, imposing the sentences concurrently was appropriate given Mr.
Valdez's attitude towards the offenses he has committed. R. 55:6. The trial court then
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imposed indeterminate zero to five year terms in prison in all five cases. R. 55:8. The
trial court stated that given Mr. Valdez's "extensive criminal history, and the fact that
these [were] all separate criminal episodes" he was ordering the terms to run
consecutively for a term of zero to twenty-five years. R. 55:8-9.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences
without considering all of the statutory factors mandated under Utah law. The presentence
report requested and prepared on Mr. Valdez considered all of the statutory factors and
recommended concurrent sentences. Instead of following the presentence report's
recommendation or explaining why it was deviating from that recommendation, the trial
court imposed consecutive sentences citing only to Mr. Valdez's criminal history and that
the offenses were separate criminal episodes. The trial court's failure to consider the
mandatory factors before imposing consecutive sentences, failure to articulate its reason
for deviating from the presentence report's recommendation, and its failure to consider
Mr. Valdez's rehabilitative needs was an abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING MR. VALDEZ TO CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF
IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT PROPERLY CONSIDERING THE
STATUTORY FACTORS AS REQUIRED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 763-401(2) (2003).
A trial court abuses its discretion when it "'fails to consider all legally relevant
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[sentencing] factors/" State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (quoting
State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133,1135 (Utah 1989) (footnote omitted)), or when the trial
judge fails to give '"adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances.'" State v.
Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^[15, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah
1998)). A trial court's "[a]buse of discretion 'may be manifest if the actions of the judge
in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the judge imposed a "clearly excessive
sentence.'"" State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1997)(citations omitted). This
Court will find a trial court has abused its discretion when it concludes that "no
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id, (quotation and
citation omitted).
Trial courts are required to consider statutory factors and address
recommendations in the presentence report before imposing a sentence for more than one
felony offense. See State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, «|[48, 52 P.3d 451. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-401 (2003), outlines the legally relevant sentencing factors a trial court is
mandated to consider before determining whether sentences will be imposes concurrently
or consecutively. Utah's appellate courts have noted that "[concurrent sentences are
favored over consecutive ones." Perez, 2002 UT App 211 at ^43 (citations omitted).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 states in part the following:
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall
indicate in the order of judgment and commitment:
7

(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively
to each other; . . .
(2) In determining whether stale offenses are to run concurrently or
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) - (2).
Among other things, the statute requires that the trial judge consider the
"rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Id. For example, in State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236
(Utah 1995) (Smith II), the defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, rape of a
child, and two counts of sodomy on a child. Id. at 238. The trial court imposed
consecutive sentences because the crimes were heinous, the defendant was a pedophile,
and although the defendant's own victimization as a child was a mitigating factor, he was
responsible to get help for himself. Id at 244. Our supreme court held the sentence was
an abuse of discretion because the trial court ignored the rehabilitative needs of the
defendant. IcL at 244-45.
An additional and highly important factor in deciding whether to impose
consecutive or concurrent sentences is that the Legislature, in enacting
indeterminate sentencing laws, has opted to give the Board of Pardons wide
latitude in deciding what a maximum sentence ought to be. State v. Strunk,
846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). The Board is in a far better position than
a court to monitor a defendant's subsequent behavior and possible progress
toward rehabilitation while in prison and to adjust the maximum sentence
accordingly.... While the trial court imposed the greatest minimum
mandatory sentences possible under the law, and justifiably so, we think it
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion to have imposed essentially a
minimum mandatory life sentence and thereby deprive the Board of Pardons
8

of discretion to take into account defendant's future conduct and possible
progress toward rehabilitation.
Id. at 244-45 (citation omitted).
Similarly, in GalH, the defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated
robbery, absconded, and lived in Minnesota for three years before being sentenced. See
Galli, 967 P.2d at 932. Our supreme court held the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering consecutive sentences because: (1) although the defendant's crimes were
serious, the record showed the trial court may not have "given adequate weight to certain
mitigating circumstances," including the fact that the defendant "did not inflict any
physical injuries/' only used a "pellet gun," and took a "relatively small" amount of
money; (2) the defendant's history consisted only of "minor traffic offenses and one
misdemeanor theft conviction," and his act of absconding only provided "nominal
support" since he was not charged with bail jumping; (3) although the defendant's
"offenses and flight from justice reflected] negatively on his character," he "voluntarily
confessed and admitted responsibility," "expressed a commitment and hope to improve
himself," and, while in Minnesota, "obeyed the law, helped his neighbors, and was a
productive individual;" and (4) concurrent sentencing "better serv[ed]" his "rehabilitative
needs by allowing the Board of Pardons and Parole to release him from prison after five
years if he has shown genuine progress toward rehabilitation." Id at 938; see Stmnk, 846
P.2d at 1301-02 (holding trial court abused discretion by sentencing 16-year-old
convicted of murder, child kidnapping, aggravated sexual abuse of a child to consecutive

sentences even though diagnostic report recommended "long period of imprisonment"
because trial court's sentence assured defendant "would spend a minimum of twenty-four
years in prison," failed to "sufficiently consider defendant's rehabilitative needs in light
of his extreme youth and the absence of prior violent crimes," and "rob[bed] the Board of
Pardons of any flexibility to parole [defendant] sooner").
Conversely, in State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the
defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and stalking. Id. at 649. On appeal, the
defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to consecutive
terms because it failed to consider that the defendant was "never known to be violent,
ha[d] never been convicted of a violent crime, was under the influence of drugs and
alcohol at the time of the stabbing, and was remorseful." IdL at 651-52. This Court ruled
the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the mitigating evidence highlighted by
the defendant was presented to the trial court and the record was "replete with evidence
supporting the trial court's finding that defendant is 'a clear and present danger' and
supporting its order in favor of incarceration rather than rehabilitation." Li at 652. The
trial court "specifically noted that on the night of the stabbing, defendant went to a public
place carrying a concealed weapon, he voluntarily over-medicated himself, voluntarily
got drunk, indiscriminately used the weapon 'with abandonment,' and put the restaurant
diners, employees, and his friend at risk." Id. Moreover, the defendant "failed to make
an effort in his own rehabilitation," despite several opportunities. IcL This Court
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distinguished the defendant's case from Strunk and Smith II because the defendant was
only sentenced to "two-to-five years in prison and six months in jail." Id. Consequently,
the trial court's sentence did not remove the Board's ability to monitor the defendant's
rehabilitative progress. Id.
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences
without adequately considering Mr. Valdez's character and rehabilitative needs. The
presentence report included Mr. Valdez's feelings about the offenses he had committed
stating that he felt "[r]egreat [sic], remorse, shame and sorry!" R. 43:2. The motivation
for Mr. Valdez in committing these offenses was "[m]oney for drugs. Heroin" but he
wanted to take responsibility yet he needed help with his addiction. R. 43:2.
I've always done time. Never a program. Can't blame society. I blame
myself. I'm a victim of my own circumstances. I've dug myself a hol[e].
It's time to stop digging. I feel if I hadn't gotten arrested I would be dead.
If I don't get help now, I probably never will. I know it's that time in my
life.
R. 43:2.
The presentence report included Mr. Valdez's statement regarding his addiction
and his desperate plea for help dealing with it. R. 43:2.
At age 17 went to state re-form school, at age 18 I went to prison. I was in
prison until I was 24 years old. S[i]nce then I've been in and out of prison
for the last 20 years. I first started doing her[oi]n while in prison. It
became my drug of choice and my addiction and cause to commit crimes for
money to buy more her[oi]n, which has lead me to where I am today which
is in jail again.
I'm not a stranger to doing time. If I thought I couldn't make it, I'd say just
11

send me to prison. (In prison) now it's just a waste of time because I don't
get help. My problem is being outside. I never believed I was
institutionalized. I just thought it was a word, but I think that has something
to do with it. My problem is trying to adapt to society. It sounds good on
paper, but when I get out I feel really lost. When you come into prison, you
spend time at R & O and it helps you adjust. There's nothing going out.
R. 43:2-3.
The presentence investigator stated that she "had empathy for [Mr. Valdez] and
thought he should be given one chance at probation with treatment" R. 43:3. However,
the investigator felt that because Mr. Valdez "repeatedly committed offenses against
society and specifically, random innocent individuals to support his drug habit" it
recommended his sentences be imposed concurrently. R. 43:3. During the sentencing
hearing the defense attorney acknowledged that Mr. Valdez has a lengthy criminal record
which has kept him "mostly in prison for the last - coming up on 40 years." R. 55:2. But
defense counsel asked the court to focus on Mr. Valdez's attitude and desire for help with
his lifelong addiction. R. 55:3.
[Sjince I first met him, he has never - not even mentioned the possibility of
getting out of jail. He's never asked to be out of jail. He told me from the
very first time I met him, "I am a drug addict. I need to be in jail. I want
help. Please get me help."

He has taken a level of responsibility that quite frankly I have not
seen before, and a level of self av/areness about what his problem is and
what needs to happen that I think is very, very rare. He's never complained.
He's never (inaudible) delays of this.
He's just taken it all in stride and said to me consistently, "That's
fine. I need to be in jail right now. I need to be clean. Please get me some
help. I've never had help. I've never had a program. I get out, you know,
12

into the world. I get -things get stressful, and I fall right back into drugs
every single time."
R. 55:3-4.
The state agreed with AP & P's recommendation of concurrent sentences. R. 55:5.
The prosecutor felt that concurrent sentences were appropriate in Mr. Valdez5 s case
given "his attitude." R. 55:6. The state also thought it was important that the parole board
have the power to "decide how well [Mr. Valdez is] doing in terms of his drug habit." R.
55:6.
In sentencing Mr. Valdez, the trial court imposed five indeterminate terms of zero
to five in each of the cases. R. 55:8. The trial court ordered the five terms to run
consecutively, citing Mr. Valdez5s lengthy criminal history, "and the fact that these
[were] all separate criminal episodes.55 R. 55:8. The trial court concluded that Mr.
Valdez was "to serve zero to twenty-five years at the Utah State Prison as a result.55 R.
55:8-9. While citing to Mr. Valdez5s criminal history and separate criminal episodes as
support for imposition of consecutive sentences, the trial court completely failed to
explain why it was ignoring the recommendations of AP & P, which after interviewing
and researching Mr. Valdez5s background initially was going to recommend "probation
with treatment" but later determined that given that he committed offenses which
involved "random innocent individuals55 in order to support his drug habit, recommended
concurrent sentences. Nor does the trial court address Mr. Valdez5s rehabilitative
potential from a life long addiction to drugs, especially since this was the motive behind
13

the theft offenses or the fact that the state agreed with imposing the sentences
concurrently, given Mr. Valdez's attitude.
A presentence report contains detailed information regarding the mandated
statutory factors a trial court is required to consider and is meant to assist a trial court in
exercising its discretion properly when imposing sentence. See State v. Helms, 2002 UT
12 at *p3. This is because a "presentence report contains detailed information regarding
not only the 'gravity and circumstances of the offenses,' but also the 'history, character,
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.5" Id. In Helms, the supreme court determined
that although a trial court's sentencing order may not "state to what extent it considered
each of the statutory factors at the sentencing hearing" a trial court's review of the
presentence report evidences that a trial court considered the relevant statutory factors
necessary. Id. at ^}13.
This Court has stated that when a trial court deviates from the recommendations of
AP&P without explanation and imposes consecutive sentences without record evidence to
indicate that all of the statutory factors had been considered, an abuse of discretion
occurs. Perez, 2002 UT App 211 at f48. In Perez, the defendant had been convicted of
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony and attempted murder, a second degree felony.
Id. at •pO. On appeal, Perez argued, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing consecutive prison terms without considering all of the required statutory
factors. Id. at ^[42. The presentence report prepared on Perez had recommended that he
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serve concurrent prison terms and the prosecutor had agreed with that recommendation.
Id. at ^[44-45. In imposing sentencing, the trial court noted that it had heard the evidence
and found that Perez's conduct in committing these offenses was "egregious." Id. at ^45.
After briefly touching on the "gravity and circumstances of the offense" the trial court
sentenced Perez to serve his terms of imprisonment consecutively. Id, at ^ 4 3 , 45. This
Court determined that "[t]he trial court's brief commentary dealt only with the 'gravity
and circumstances of the offenses,' and did not explicitly address the presentence report's
recommendation of concurrent sentences." Id at ^[48. Nothing in the record indicated
that the trial court "'considered] the . . . history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.5" Id. (citation
omitted) (alteration in original).
As seen in Perez, trial courts often focus their sentencing decisions based on their
consideration of the "gravity and circumstances of the offense" alone, and often fail to
adequately evaluate the other statutory factors. Often an abuse of discretion can be found
because of a trial court's failure to consider the rehabilitative needs of a defendant.
Like the trial courts in Smith II and Galli, the trial court in this case failed to
consider Mr. Valdez's character or rehabilitative needs and removed from the Board of
Pardons and Parole the opportunity to monitor Mr. Valdez's rehabilitation and decide his
rehabilitative needs if he continued to show improvement through an appropriate
treatment program. Also, like the trial court in Perez, the trial court abused its discretion
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by deviating from the state's and presentence report's recommendation without
considering all of the statutory factors and imposing consecutive sentences in this case
where it is clearly unfair and excessive.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by imposing
five consecutive terms of zero to five years in prison without considering all of the
statutory factors and imposing consecutive sentences that were clearly unfair and
excessive.
SUBMITTED this J 5

day of January, 2008.

"DEBRA M. NELSON
PATRICK W. CORUM
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells
Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 841140854, this

[ 5 * day of January, 2008

DEBRA M. NELSON

DELIVERED this

day of January, 2008
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 061904724 FS

PATRICK HENRY VALDEZ,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

DENO HIMONAS
June 22, 2 0 07

PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: PLATT, CHAD L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): CORUM, PATRICK W
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 6, 1953
Video
Tape Count: 10-59
CHARGES
1. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 04/20/2007 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN
PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
TRUS COPY OF AN
THE THIRD
UNTY, STATE

Page 1
COURT CLERK

Case No: 061904724
Date:
Jun 22, 2007

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Court orders this case run CONSECUTIVE with case #061906778,
#061905899, #061907518, #071901234. Credit Time Served.

Dated this <PP- day of

<

^~~~/UAJL^_

By_.
STAMP

Page 2 (last)

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 061905899 FS

PATRICK HENRY VALDEZ,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DENO HIMONAS
June 22, 2007

PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: PLATT, CHAD L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): CORUM, PATRICK W
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 6, 1953
Video
Tape Count: 10-59
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED BURGLARY (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 04/20/2007 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED BURGLARY a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
JE COPY OF

Page 1

Case No: 061905899
Date:
Jun 22, 2007

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Court orders this case run CONSECUTIVE with case #0619064778,
#061904724, #061907518, #071901234. Credit Time Served.

Dated this P-P-~ day of

-f^—

., 20 6 7

DENO _
District C ^ u ^ V ^

Page 2 (last)

3:
pf?,.'i.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 061907518 FS

PATRICK HENRY VALDEZ,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DENO HIMONAS
June 22, 2007

PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: PLATT, CHAD L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): CORUM, PATRICK W
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 6, 1953
Video
Tape Count: 10-59
CHARGES
1. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 04/20/2007 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prig^fwnef^the
defendant will be confined.
/f&&^"***
^
e
i C £ R T i / ^ ^ l ^ ^ B U ^ P Y OF AN
O R I G I I ^ ^ U ^ M t W ^ S w ^ H E THIRD
DiSTRP f gU^AWLA^QfeJ^TY, STATE

Page 1

Case No: 061907518
Date:
Jun 22, 2007

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Court orders this case run CONSECUTIVE with case #061906778,
#061904724, #061905899, #071901234. Credit Time Served.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 071901234 FS

PATRICK HENRY VALDEZ,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

DENO HIMONAS
June 22, 2007

PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: PLATT, CHAD L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): CORUM, PATRICK W
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 6, 1953
Video
Tape Count: 10-59
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY (amended) - 3rd
Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/20/2007 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT BY RECEIVING
STOLEN PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison wj^gej^lgp
AH
defendant will be confined.
,CERT1FYTW^fe
D
ORIGINAL
O
R l G I N A U O O O ^ p ^ J ^ ^ STATE
DISTRICTCOUaT^^LAK&^UWY,
oI Ai
DISTRICT
OF UTAi
OFUTArf.
V \ /,, /*ki
I

DATEu

Page 1
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3 l ^

Case No: 071901234
Date:
Jun 22, 2007

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Court orders thxs case run CONSECUTIVE with case #061906778,
061904724, #061905899, #061907518. Credit Time Served.

Dated this

S^-day of

., 20 D7-

Page 2 (last)

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
S ENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 061906778 FS

DONALD RUDOLPH VALDEZ,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DENO HIMONAS
June 22, 2 007

PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: PLATT, CHAD L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): CORUM, PATRICK W
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 18, 1951
Video
Tape Count: 10-59
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY (amended) - 3rd
Degree Felony
- Disposition: 04/20/2007 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT BY RECEIVING
STOLEN PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To t h e SALT LAKE County S h e r i f f :
The d e f e n d a n t i / ^ e m a n d e d t o y o u r
custody f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o t h e Utah S t a t e Priiron^wiere the; ;
d e f e n d a n t w i l l be c o n f i n e d .
i CERAY T A ^ H I S IG ArelfcccfpY OF AN
THIRD
ORIGINAL D C J C W i j i t f l ^
DISTRICT&COga^SALT L ^ c 0 O # T Y , STATE
OF UTAH.
^OiSTB^

DATE:

Page 1

JL

Case No: 061906778
Date:
Jun 22, 2007

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Court orders this case run CONSECUTIVE with case #061904724,
#061905899. #061907518, 071901234. Credit Time Served.

Dated this J P 2 : day of

Distrd/j

Page 2 ( l a s t )

JUDGE
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003)
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences - Limitations - Definition.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and
commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other;
and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any
other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims,
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are
to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or
concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under
Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single
term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:

(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any,
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located.

Amended by Chapter 129, 2002 General Session
History: C. 1953, 76-3-401, enacted by L,
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-401; 1974, ch. 32, § 7;
1989, ch. 181, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 21; 1995,
ch. 139, § 1; 1997, ch. 283, § 1; 1999, ch. 275,
§ 1; 2002, ch. 129, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective May 3,1999,. subdivided Subsection (6), added Subsection (6)(b)(ii), and made
related changes; substituted "of the defendant's
initial sentence" for "of sentence for any one or
more of them" in Subsection (7)(b); added "and
the conduct giving rise to the present offense
did not occur after his initial sentencing by any
other court" at the end of Subsection (7)(c);

added "When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a)
applies" at the beginning of Subsection (8); and
made stylistic changes.
The 2002 amendment, effective July 1, 2002,
divided former Subsection (1) into Subsections
(1) and (2); in Subsection (1) added the second
sentence and added Subsections (l)(a) and
(l)(b); deleted former Subsection (4) and added
the language to Subsection (2); deleted "has
reason to believe that the later offense occurred
while the person was imprisoned or on parole
for the earlier offense" following "Board of Pardons and Parole" in Subsection (4); and made
related and stylistic changes.

